CC Macro Analysis OSChina nominal growth
Thesis & Evidence

Hypotheses, tests and claims

China's GDP deflator turns non-negative and stays there for two consecutive quarters by the 2027Q1 GDP release, supported by a broadening of domestic demand rather than by supply-side or imported price pressure alone.

Evidence tests move one hypothesis each. Only the preregistered terminal rules below can confirm or falsify the thesis. Results are the automatic evidence state as of 4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC; the last column shows each test at the baseline (4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC).

Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score. A tally of passing and failing tests says nothing about how much each one matters, and several tests share the same underlying data. The qualitative state of each hypothesis is the analyst's judgment.

H1 · Price turn

Industrial and consumer prices are bottoming, and the GDP deflator is moving toward zero or above.

Partly confirmed Turned in level terms; momentum has been uneven.

Baseline assessment: Price turn has happened in level terms; momentum faded after the oil peak, and the September PMI suggests a pickup.

TestConditionWindowObservedLatestResultAt baseline
T-H1-01 PPI month-on-month momentum is positive on a 3-month average.
Technical lineage
ma(cn_ppi_mom,3) · latest > 0
latest 3 months
NBS CPI/PPI release
-0.20 Aug 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H1-02 PPI YoY is higher than six months earlier.
Technical lineage
cn_ppi_yoy · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
NBS CPI/PPI release
4.70 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H1-03 PMI output prices signal rising factory-gate prices on average.
Technical lineage
ma(cn_pmi_output_price,3) · latest >= 50
latest 3 months
NBS PMI release
50.73 Sep 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H1-04 The implied GDP deflator is non-negative in the latest quarter.
Technical lineage
deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy) · latest >= 0
latest quarter
NBS quarterly GDP release
1.53 2026 Q2 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H1-05 The implied GDP deflator is non-negative for two consecutive quarters.
Technical lineage
deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy) · streak(2) >= 0
latest 2 quarters
NBS quarterly GDP release
1.53 2026 Q2 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H1-06 Industrial profits are growing year-to-date (reflation reaching margins).
Technical lineage
cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy · latest > 0
latest month
NBS industrial profits release
15.70 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports

Tally: ▲ 4 support · ▼ 2 challenge · ○ 0 awaiting data. Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score.

Evidence for

The implied GDP deflator turned positive at +1.5% year on year in 2026Q2, from -0.1% in 2026Q1, after negative readings in every quarter from 2023Q2 to 2026Q1.

Derived National Bureau of Statistics · Implied GDP deflator, year on year (2023 Q2 – 2026 Q2) · released 15 Jul 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-T-01 · DERIVED · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2026Q2 = 1.5266
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2026Q2, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q2, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2026Q2
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2026Q1 = -0.0589
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2026Q1, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q1, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2026Q1
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2023Q2 = -0.7271
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q2, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2022Q2, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2023Q2
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2023Q3 = -0.824
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q3, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2022Q3, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2023Q3
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2023Q4 = -0.9048
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q4, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2022Q4, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2023Q4
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2024Q1 = -1.0846
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q1, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q1, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2024Q1
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2024Q2 = -0.7597
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q2, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q2, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2024Q2
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2024Q3 = -0.6129
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q3, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q3, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2024Q3
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2024Q4 = -0.7975
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q4, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2023Q4, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2024Q4
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2025Q1 = -0.7799
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q1, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q1, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2025Q1
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2025Q2 = -1.2372
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q2, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q2, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2025Q2
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2025Q3 = -1.0413
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q3, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q3, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2025Q3
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2025Q4 = -0.6172
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q4, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2024Q4, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2025Q4
drv:deflator_yoy(cn_ngdp_q,cn_rgdp_yoy)@2026Q1 = -0.0589
inputs: obs:cn_ngdp_q@2026Q1, obs:cn_ngdp_q@2025Q1, obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2026Q1

PPI was +3.8% year on year in 2026-08, against -1.9% in 2025-12: factory-gate prices have moved from deflation to inflation within the year.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · PPI YoY (Aug 2026, Dec 2025) · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-01 · FACT · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ppi_yoy@2026-08 = 3.8 · source code nbs:60e8b361f11c4a878c652a6487a25561/150633e52b9a470a9a9fd1b296dd6c5b@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_yoy@2025-12 = -1.9 · source code nbs:60e8b361f11c4a878c652a6487a25561/150633e52b9a470a9a9fd1b296dd6c5b@idx100 · released 9 Jan 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC

Industrial profits were +15.7% year on year, year to date, in 2026-08, after +0.6% for 2025 as a whole.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Industrial enterprise profits, YTD YoY (Aug 2026, Dec 2025) · released 28 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-03 · FACT · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2026-08 = 15.7 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 28 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2025-12 = 0.6 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 27 Jan 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC

The PMI output price index rose to 54.0 in 2026-09 from 47.8 in 2026-07, a sign that factory-gate momentum picked up again going into the September PPI release.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Manufacturing PMI, output prices (Sep 2026, Jul 2026) · released 30 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-05 · FACT · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_pmi_output_price@2026-09 = 54.0 · source code https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202609/t20260930_1965449.html · released 30 Sep 2026 (source_field) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:32 UTC
obs:cn_pmi_output_price@2026-07 = 47.8 · source code nbs:93ffbb1aa85740d3aa2618371508b606/105a73cd48cc47d4a914ebccdedf24ec · released 31 Jul 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

The largest PPI gains coincided with the oil spike: PPI moved +1.0% and +1.7% month on month in 2026-03 and 2026-04, when Brent averaged 99 USD and 103 USD.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · PPI MoM (Apr 2026, Mar 2026) · released 11 May 2026 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · Brent crude, monthly average (Apr 2026, Mar 2026) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H0-04 · FACT · H0, H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-03 = 1.0 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 10 Apr 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-04 = 1.7 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 11 May 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-03 = 99.405 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-04 = 102.8136 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC

The price leg of the thesis is more likely than not to hold through 2027Q1. The factory-gate price level is well above a year earlier, so the deflator would turn negative again only if commodity prices fell back sharply.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-05 · INFERENCE · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-T-01, C-H1-01, C-H0-01
References

Evidence against

Month-on-month PPI momentum has faded: +1.7% in 2026-04, then -0.3% in 2026-06, -0.7% in 2026-07 and +0.4% in 2026-08.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · PPI MoM (Aug 2026, Jul 2026, Jun 2026, Apr 2026) · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-02 · FACT · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-04 = 1.7 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 11 May 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-06 = -0.3 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 9 Jul 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-07 = -0.7 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 9 Aug 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-08 = 0.4 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC

So far the price turn looks supply-led. It is concentrated in producer goods, it coincides with the oil and metals shock, and it lost momentum when oil eased. That fits H0 better than a demand-led recovery.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-01 · INFERENCE · H0, H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H0-01, C-H0-02, C-H0-04, C-H1-02
References

Year-to-date industrial profit growth has slowed in every month since May: 18.8% in 2026-05, 18.7% in 2026-06, 17.6% in 2026-07 and 15.7% in 2026-08.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Industrial enterprise profits, YTD YoY (Aug 2026, Jul 2026, Jun 2026, May 2026) · released 28 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-06 · FACT · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2026-05 = 18.8 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 27 Jun 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2026-06 = 18.7 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 27 Jul 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2026-07 = 17.6 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 27 Aug 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC
obs:cn_ind_profit_ytd_yoy@2026-08 = 15.7 · source code nbs:643feccdedb64e38a64c65a00c390646/9d63a27d727d4beeb32529078442cdd4 · released 28 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:26 UTC

Because year-to-date profit growth has been falling since May, growth in the latest single month is running below the cumulative rate. The headline year-to-date figure therefore overstates current profit momentum.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-06 · INFERENCE · H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H1-06, C-H1-03
References

H2 · Domestic demand

Private domestic demand (credit, consumption, property, orders) is stabilising or improving.

Not yet confirmed Broad confirmation is absent. Levels are weak, and the tests that pass rest on marginal changes from weak levels.

Baseline assessment: Not supported on levels; the change-based tests that pass do so on marginal readings, and new orders are hovering at the expansion line.

TestConditionWindowObservedLatestResultAt baseline
T-H2-01 Core CPI inflation is higher than six months earlier.
Technical lineage
cn_core_cpi_yoy · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
NBS CPI/PPI release
-0.80 Aug 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H2-02 M1 growth is higher than six months earlier.
Technical lineage
cn_m1_yoy · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
PBOC monetary statistics
-1.80 Aug 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H2-03 Property sales are contracting less (or growing more) than six months earlier.
Technical lineage
cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
NBS property release
1.40 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H2-04 Manufacturing new orders are expanding on a 3-month average.
Technical lineage
ma(cn_pmi_new_orders,3) · latest >= 50
latest 3 months
NBS PMI release
49.87 Sep 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H2-05 Retail sales growth is higher than three months earlier.
Technical lineage
cn_retail_sales_yoy · change(3) > 0
change over 3 months
NBS monthly activity release
1.00 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H2-06 Net new medium and long-term household loans (mortgages) are positive on a 3-month average.
Technical lineage
single(cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd) · avg(3) > 0
latest 3 months
PBOC monetary statistics
-146.68 Aug 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges

Tally: ▲ 2 support · ▼ 4 challenge · ○ 0 awaiting data. Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score.

Evidence for

None recorded.

Evidence against

Property sales area was -12.1% year on year, year to date, in 2026-08: a steeper decline than the -8.7% recorded for 2025 as a whole.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Commodity building sales area, YTD YoY (Aug 2026, Dec 2025) · released 15 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-01 · FACT · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-08 = -12.1 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 15 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2025-12 = -8.7 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 19 Jan 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

Net new medium and long-term household loans were 1,584 in 2026-06, -1,202 in 2026-07 and -822 in 2026-08 (CNY 100m, derived from PBOC balances): mortgage books are still shrinking on balance.

Derived People's Bank of China · New RMB loans to households, medium and long term, year-to-date, single month (Aug 2026, Jul 2026, Jun 2026) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-02 · DERIVED · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
drv:single(cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd)@2026-06 = 1584.36
inputs: obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-06, obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-05
drv:single(cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd)@2026-07 = -1202.15
inputs: obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-07, obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-06
drv:single(cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd)@2026-08 = -822.24
inputs: obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-08, obs:cn_loans_hh_mlt_ytd@2026-07

Retail sales grew 0.4% year on year in 2026-08, against 3.4% a year earlier.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Retail sales of consumer goods YoY (Aug 2026, Aug 2025) · released 15 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-03 · FACT · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_retail_sales_yoy@2026-08 = 0.4 · source code nbs:d0cb882c7f27443ab6b3ef9421901961/aaac57d54d2e465d91bc9f3ea1a8618e · released 15 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_retail_sales_yoy@2025-08 = 3.4 · source code nbs:d0cb882c7f27443ab6b3ef9421901961/aaac57d54d2e465d91bc9f3ea1a8618e · released 15 Sep 2025 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

M1 growth was 4.1% in 2026-08, down from 5.9% in 2026-02.

Fact People's Bank of China · M1 YoY (Aug 2026, Feb 2026) · released 14 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-04 · FACT · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_m1_yoy@2026-08 = 4.1 · source code https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026091414593871200/index.html · released 14 Sep 2026 (source_field) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:32 UTC
obs:cn_m1_yoy@2026-02 = 5.9 · source code nbs:82130c6621a745cda3d64b090e733383/640401d3351b4b868dea28f89f410a54 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:03 UTC

Core CPI was +1.0% in 2026-08, no higher than the +1.2% of 2025-12: no sign yet of demand-pull inflation.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Core CPI YoY (ex food and energy) (Aug 2026, Dec 2025) · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-05 · FACT · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_core_cpi_yoy@2026-08 = 1.0 · source code nbs:5c7452825c7c4dcba391db5ca7f335c5/71be3d43d2fb44188199840272463ae0@idx100|nbs:809d2522b0fe4be89142650341b19083/c2050e97c49a4763a6d0f0f38bf0b4ed@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_core_cpi_yoy@2025-12 = 1.2 · source code nbs:5c7452825c7c4dcba391db5ca7f335c5/71be3d43d2fb44188199840272463ae0@idx100|nbs:809d2522b0fe4be89142650341b19083/c2050e97c49a4763a6d0f0f38bf0b4ed@idx100 · released 9 Jan 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

The manufacturing PMI new orders index was 50.5 in 2026-09, but its three-month average was 49.9: orders are hovering at the expansion line rather than expanding.

Derived National Bureau of Statistics · September 2026 Manufacturing PMI, new orders · released 30 Sep 2026 National Bureau of Statistics · September 2026 Manufacturing PMI, new orders, 3-month average · released 30 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-06 · DERIVED · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_pmi_new_orders@2026-09 = 50.5 · source code https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202609/t20260930_1965449.html · released 30 Sep 2026 (source_field) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:32 UTC
drv:ma(cn_pmi_new_orders,3)@2026-09 = 49.8667
inputs: obs:cn_pmi_new_orders@2026-09, obs:cn_pmi_new_orders@2026-08, obs:cn_pmi_new_orders@2026-07

Private domestic demand has not turned. Property sales, mortgage flow, M1 and core CPI are all weak. The demand tests that pass do so on marginal second-derivative readings, not on strength.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-02 · INFERENCE · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H2-01, C-H2-02, C-H2-03, C-H2-04, C-H2-05, C-H2-06
References

The year-to-date decline in property sales area has widened in every month since April: -10.2% in 2026-04, -10.8% in 2026-05, -11.6% in 2026-06, -11.8% in 2026-07 and -12.1% in 2026-08.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Commodity building sales area, YTD YoY (Apr 2026 – Aug 2026) · released 15 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H2-07 · FACT · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-04 = -10.2 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 18 May 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-05 = -10.8 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 16 Jun 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-06 = -11.6 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 15 Jul 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-07 = -11.8 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 17 Aug 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC
obs:cn_property_sales_area_ytd_yoy@2026-08 = -12.1 · source code nbs:0ae633cdb85f4a8397650831b2b27e50/50a37fbef1d04be68f15d82b711783bf · released 15 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

Because the cumulative decline has widened every month since April, sales in the latest single months are weaker than the year-to-date rate. The change-based property test that passes compares August with the weak January-February starting point, so that pass reflects the weak early-year starting point more than a recent improvement.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-07 · INFERENCE · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H2-07, C-H2-01
References

Broad domestic-demand confirmation is still absent. By level, property sales, household mortgage flow, M1 and core CPI remain weak. The demand tests that do pass do so on marginal changes from weak levels, and the one forward-looking improvement, September manufacturing new orders above the expansion line, is not yet confirmed by its three-month average.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-08 · INFERENCE · H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 13:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H2-01, C-H2-02, C-H2-03, C-H2-04, C-H2-05, C-H2-06, C-H2-07
References

H3 · Policy impulse

Fiscal and credit impulse is large and persistent enough to support nominal demand.

Mixed Realized impulse is weak; the forward stance is more supportive.

Baseline assessment: Fading; credit growth slowing and on-budget spending weak.

Realized policy impulse remains weak in current quantitative data, while the forward policy stance has become more supportive. Policy context ›

TestConditionWindowObservedLatestResultAt baseline
T-H3-01 Aggregate credit growth is not decelerating over the last quarter.
Technical lineage
cn_tsf_stock_yoy · change(3) >= 0
change over 3 months
PBOC monetary statistics
-0.50 Aug 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges
T-H3-02 Budget expenditure is growing year-to-date.
Technical lineage
cn_budget_exp_ytd_yoy · latest > 0
latest month
MOF budget release
1.30 Jul 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports

Tally: ▲ 1 support · ▼ 1 challenge · ○ 0 awaiting data. Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score.

Evidence for

None recorded.

Evidence against

Total social financing stock growth slowed to 7.2% in 2026-08 from 8.3% in 2025-12.

Fact People's Bank of China · Total social financing stock YoY (Aug 2026, Dec 2025) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H3-01 · FACT · H3
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_tsf_stock_yoy@2026-08 = 7.2 · source code pboc:社会融资规模存量统计表:社会融资规模存量增速 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:10 UTC
obs:cn_tsf_stock_yoy@2025-12 = 8.3 · source code pboc:社会融资规模存量统计表:社会融资规模存量增速 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:10 UTC

General budget expenditure grew only 1.3% year to date in 2026-07.

Fact Ministry of Finance (via the NBS portal) · July 2026 General public budget expenditure, YTD YoY · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H3-02 · FACT · H3
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_budget_exp_ytd_yoy@2026-07 = 1.3 · source code nbs:37564a0046c14c059382e3ad26a0d94f/8dc84fd764df46a294e54a7662b1a38a · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:03 UTC

Policy impulse is fading rather than building: credit growth is decelerating and on-budget spending is barely growing, so policy is not yet bridging the gap left by private demand.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-03 · INFERENCE · H3
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H3-01, C-H3-02
References

H4 · External demand

Exports are a support for, not a drag on, nominal growth.

Supportive Exports are strong, but new export orders are only at the expansion line.

Baseline assessment: Supportive; exports strong, new export orders only at the expansion line.

TestConditionWindowObservedLatestResultAt baseline
T-H4-01 Exports are growing on a 3-month average.
Technical lineage
ma(cn_exports_usd_yoy,3) · latest > 0
latest 3 months
GACC trade release
25.30 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H4-02 New export orders are expanding on a 3-month average.
Technical lineage
ma(cn_pmi_new_export_orders,3) · latest >= 50
latest 3 months
NBS PMI release
49.90 Sep 2026 ▼ challenges ▼ challenges

Tally: ▲ 1 support · ▼ 1 challenge · ○ 0 awaiting data. Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score.

Evidence for

Exports grew 25.0% year on year in dollar terms in 2026-08, after 23.9% in 2026-07.

Fact General Administration of Customs · Exports in USD, YoY (Aug 2026, Jul 2026) · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H4-01 · FACT · H4
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_exports_usd_yoy@2026-08 = 25.0 · source code http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/f8da41eb-f559-4b41-988e-16a0a1869f0e.html · released 9 Sep 2026 (source_field) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:32 UTC
obs:cn_exports_usd_yoy@2026-07 = 23.9 · source code nbs:7e11b47c828d4e4e925f1c5a98305558/788f44b0f310403fbd308b77d6f83890 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:03 UTC

Exports are a genuine support for nominal growth. But external demand cannot by itself make the turn sustainable under this thesis, which requires domestic demand confirmation.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-04 · INFERENCE · H4
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H4-01, C-H4-02
References

Evidence against

None recorded.

H0 · Supply-led bounce (competing) competing

Any price improvement is driven by supply discipline or imported commodity costs without demand confirmation, so it is not sustainable.

Best-fitting alternative It fits the upstream-led pattern better than a demand-led recovery; the data are consistent with it but do not prove the mechanism.

Baseline assessment: Best-supported explanation so far.

TestConditionWindowObservedLatestResultAt baseline
T-H0-01 Oil is higher than six months earlier (imported cost push).
Technical lineage
gl_brent_usd · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
monthly
19.14 Jul 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H0-02 Copper is higher than six months earlier (global metals cost push).
Technical lineage
gl_copper_usd · change(6) > 0
change over 6 months
monthly
556.21 Jul 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports
T-H0-03 Consumer-goods factory prices are still falling, so the PPI rise has not passed downstream.
Technical lineage
cn_ppi_consumer_yoy · latest < 0
latest month
NBS CPI/PPI release (diagnostic, triggered by T-H1-02)
-0.50 Aug 2026 ▲ supports ▲ supports

Tally: ▲ 3 support · ▼ 0 challenge · ○ 0 awaiting data. Test counts are diagnostics, not a weighted score.

Evidence for

Brent averaged 104 USD a barrel in 2026-05 and 84 USD in 2026-07, against 62 USD in 2025-12.

Fact Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · Brent crude, monthly average (Jul 2026, May 2026, Dec 2025) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H0-01 · FACT · H0
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-05 = 103.8424 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-07 = 83.7341 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2025-12 = 61.8109 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC

The PPI rise is upstream: producer-goods PPI was +5.0% year on year in 2026-08 while consumer-goods PPI was still -0.5%.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · August 2026 PPI, producer goods YoY · released 9 Sep 2026 National Bureau of Statistics · August 2026 PPI, consumer goods YoY · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H0-02 · FACT · H0
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ppi_producer_yoy@2026-08 = 5.0 · source code nbs:60e8b361f11c4a878c652a6487a25561/47f8464961184392bc4f6a4b8e5b1cb5@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:24 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_consumer_yoy@2026-08 = -0.5 · source code nbs:60e8b361f11c4a878c652a6487a25561/649b27dbffb14466a3f204e16f3c74ed@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:24 UTC

Copper averaged 13,543 USD a tonne in 2026-07, against 9,771 USD a year earlier.

Fact Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · Copper, monthly average (Jul 2026, Jul 2025) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H0-03 · FACT · H0
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:gl_copper_usd@2026-07 = 13542.8209 · source code PCOPPUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_copper_usd@2025-07 = 9770.5804 · source code PCOPPUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC

The largest PPI gains coincided with the oil spike: PPI moved +1.0% and +1.7% month on month in 2026-03 and 2026-04, when Brent averaged 99 USD and 103 USD.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · PPI MoM (Apr 2026, Mar 2026) · released 11 May 2026 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · Brent crude, monthly average (Apr 2026, Mar 2026) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H0-04 · FACT · H0, H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-03 = 1.0 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 10 Apr 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_ppi_mom@2026-04 = 1.7 · source code nbs:677cfbb4f06941af8c1761c4804e58cf/e64079bae9064aebad1c4c5fe0c8a6ef@idx100 · released 11 May 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-03 = 99.405 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_brent_usd@2026-04 = 102.8136 · source code POILBREUSDM · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC

Evidence against

So far the price turn looks supply-led. It is concentrated in producer goods, it coincides with the oil and metals shock, and it lost momentum when oil eased. That fits H0 better than a demand-led recovery.

Inference
Technical lineage
Claim
I-01 · INFERENCE · H0, H1
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
Rests on
C-H0-01, C-H0-02, C-H0-04, C-H1-02
References

Policy context

Official policy events, curated by hand from official sources. They give context for H3 (policy impulse) and are not evidence tests: they never feed a terminal rule and they do not change the preregistered baseline or any earlier judgment.

LayerWhat it holdsCurrent read
Frozen baseline judgmentThe information the preregistered baseline used for H3: the credit and budget tests and the claims behind them. No policy announcement is part of it.Unchanged. It is never rewritten.
Forward policy stanceOfficial events listed below, with their stage.Realized policy impulse remains weak in current quantitative data, while the forward policy stance has become more supportive.
Realized quantitative impulseWhat the latest credit and budget-expenditure data show, on the H3 tests.
Total social financing stock growth slowed to 7.2% in 2026-08 from 8.3% in 2025-12.
General budget expenditure grew only 1.3% year to date in 2026-07.

Realized impulse is what the credit and budget data show. An announcement or an allocation is not yet realized impulse.

30 Sep 2026 · National Development and Reform Commission · Consumption

Full-year funding for consumer-goods trade-ins from ultra-long special treasury bonds fully allocated

Public before the baseline date, but not used in the frozen baseline judgment

  1. Signal
  2. Announced
  3. Funded
  4. Implementation
  5. Observed impact
Policy measure
The NDRC, with the Ministry of Finance, allocated to localities the fourth batch (RMB 62.5bn) of this year's ultra-long special treasury bond funds for consumer-goods trade-ins, so the full-year amount of RMB 250bn is now fully allocated.
Transmission channel
Fiscal transfer to localities, then household subsidies on autos, appliances and digital products, then retail sales
Linked hypothesis
H3, H2
Analyst interpretation
Funding is no longer a constraint on the trade-in programme this year, which makes the forward fiscal stance on consumption more supportive. Allocation is not disbursement and not demand. The effect has to appear in retail sales and its trade-in categories, and the H3 credit and budget tests do not isolate this funding.
Next observable confirmation
Retail sales growth, and its autos and appliances components, in the September activity release; the pace of subsidy payments; whether consumer-goods PPI and core CPI respond.

Source: National Development and Reform Commission · official source · checked against the source on 4 Oct 2026

Technical lineage
Claim
POL-2026-09-30-NDRC · funded
Headline on the source page
2026年2500亿元超长期特别国债支持消费品以旧换新资金已全部下达
URL
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/202609/t20260930_1407948.html
28 Sep 2026 · State Council (executive meeting) · Macro-policy mix

Executive meeting on making macro policy more effective and promoting effective investment

Public before the baseline date, but not used in the frozen baseline judgment

  1. Signal
  2. Announced
  3. Funded
  4. Implementation
  5. Observed impact
Policy measure
Calls for stronger counter-cyclical adjustment of macro policy. Stock policies are to be implemented more effectively and bond issuance and use sped up; major projects are to start earlier; interest-subsidy support for investment and consumption is to be stepped up. A batch of incremental policies is to be introduced, including better use of fiscal spending and of the local-government debt quota carried over, adjustment of monetary tools with more relending quota for technology, equipment upgrading, agriculture and small firms, and measures to stabilise the property market and support employment and incomes.
Transmission channel
Fiscal (bond issuance and use), investment (project starts), monetary (relending quotas); property and employment measures still to be framed
Linked hypothesis
H3, H2
Analyst interpretation
A clear shift towards a more supportive forward policy stance. It sets direction; it is not yet realized impulse. Credit and budget-spending data through August still show a weak impulse, and the incremental measures are not yet quantified or funded. It strengthens the case that H3 could firm later, but it changes neither the preregistered tests nor the baseline judgment.
Next observable confirmation
Publication, sizing and funding of the incremental measures; faster government-bond financing in total social financing and in budget expenditure in the September and October releases; relending quota announcements; early project starts.

Source: Central People's Government of the PRC (gov.cn) · official source · checked against the source on 4 Oct 2026

Technical lineage
Claim
POL-2026-09-28-SC · announced
Headline on the source page
李强主持召开国务院常务会议 研究宏观政策发力提效、促进有效投资有关工作等
URL
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202609/content_7082280.htm

Terminal decision rules (preregistered)

Sustainable means: Deflator YoY >= 0 in 2026Q4 and 2027Q1, and at least 3 of 6 domestic-demand tests passing at the terminal release.

ACTIVE before the window. At the window, RETIRED (inconclusive) only when required terminal data are insufficient to decide CONFIRMED or FALSIFIED. Terminal check now: ACTIVE. As amended by A-01 (Terminal rules made consistent with the preregistered definition of "sustainable"), committed before any tested release.

Confirmed

Fires when

  • All of the following hold:
    • Test passes: The implied GDP deflator is non-negative for two consecutive quarters. T-H1-05 · currently not satisfied
    • At least 3 of these 6 hold: · 2 satisfied so far
      • Test passes: Core CPI inflation is higher than six months earlier. T-H2-01 · currently not satisfied
      • Test passes: M1 growth is higher than six months earlier. T-H2-02 · currently not satisfied
      • Test passes: Property sales are contracting less (or growing more) than six months earlier. T-H2-03 · currently satisfied
      • Test passes: Manufacturing new orders are expanding on a 3-month average. T-H2-04 · currently not satisfied
      • Test passes: Retail sales growth is higher than three months earlier. T-H2-05 · currently satisfied
      • Test passes: Net new medium and long-term household loans (mortgages) are positive on a 3-month average. T-H2-06 · currently not satisfied
Technical details: the rule as stored
{
  "when": {
    "all": [
      {
        "test": "T-H1-05"
      },
      {
        "at_least": 3,
        "of": [
          {
            "test": "T-H2-01"
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-02"
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-03"
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-04"
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-05"
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-06"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

Falsified

Fires when

  • At least one of the following holds:
    • Test fails: The implied GDP deflator is non-negative for two consecutive quarters. T-H1-05 · currently satisfied
    • At least 4 of these 6 hold: · 4 satisfied so far
      • Test fails: Core CPI inflation is higher than six months earlier. T-H2-01 · currently satisfied
      • Test fails: M1 growth is higher than six months earlier. T-H2-02 · currently satisfied
      • Test fails: Property sales are contracting less (or growing more) than six months earlier. T-H2-03 · currently not satisfied
      • Test fails: Manufacturing new orders are expanding on a 3-month average. T-H2-04 · currently satisfied
      • Test fails: Retail sales growth is higher than three months earlier. T-H2-05 · currently not satisfied
      • Test fails: Net new medium and long-term household loans (mortgages) are positive on a 3-month average. T-H2-06 · currently satisfied
Technical details: the rule as stored
{
  "when": {
    "any": [
      {
        "test": "T-H1-05",
        "is": false
      },
      {
        "at_least": 4,
        "of": [
          {
            "test": "T-H2-01",
            "is": false
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-02",
            "is": false
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-03",
            "is": false
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-04",
            "is": false
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-05",
            "is": false
          },
          {
            "test": "T-H2-06",
            "is": false
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

Falsified early before the window

Fires when

  • All of the following hold:
    • Test fails: PPI month-on-month momentum is positive on a 3-month average. T-H1-01 · currently satisfied
    • Test fails: PPI YoY is higher than six months earlier. T-H1-02 · currently not satisfied
    • Test fails: Core CPI inflation is higher than six months earlier. T-H2-01 · currently satisfied
    • Test fails: Manufacturing new orders are expanding on a 3-month average. T-H2-04 · currently satisfied
Technical details: the rule as stored
{
  "early": true,
  "status": "FALSIFIED",
  "when": {
    "all": [
      {
        "test": "T-H1-01",
        "is": false
      },
      {
        "test": "T-H1-02",
        "is": false
      },
      {
        "test": "T-H2-01",
        "is": false
      },
      {
        "test": "T-H2-04",
        "is": false
      }
    ]
  }
}

Other claims

Real GDP grew 4.3% year on year in 2026Q2, down from 5.0% in 2026Q1.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · Real GDP YoY, single quarter (2026 Q2, 2026 Q1) · released 15 Jul 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-T-02 · FACT · H1, H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2026Q2 = 4.3 · source code nbs:f9b694c9b79e4ce5958bc88c6410fa67/170e7f00f8c24ede863c0526b42ae81f@idx100 · released 15 Jul 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_rgdp_yoy@2026Q1 = 5.0 · source code nbs:f9b694c9b79e4ce5958bc88c6410fa67/170e7f00f8c24ede863c0526b42ae81f@idx100 · released 16 Apr 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC

Consumer prices remain subdued: CPI was +0.8% and core CPI +1.0% year on year in 2026-08.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · August 2026 CPI YoY · released 9 Sep 2026 National Bureau of Statistics · August 2026 Core CPI YoY (ex food and energy) · released 9 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H1-04 · FACT · H1, H2
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_cpi_yoy@2026-08 = 0.8 · source code nbs:5c7452825c7c4dcba391db5ca7f335c5/53180dfb9c14411ba4b762307c85920c@idx100|nbs:809d2522b0fe4be89142650341b19083/4ae9047687934a6390984c21d6ddab96@idx100|nbs:9d4eec43537742a7ab5d63db97fa2f51/e5c318ffdbbc4d38898e52b52267eb25@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:22 UTC
obs:cn_core_cpi_yoy@2026-08 = 1.0 · source code nbs:5c7452825c7c4dcba391db5ca7f335c5/71be3d43d2fb44188199840272463ae0@idx100|nbs:809d2522b0fe4be89142650341b19083/c2050e97c49a4763a6d0f0f38bf0b4ed@idx100 · released 9 Sep 2026 (official_calendar) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:23 UTC

The US 10-year Treasury yield averaged 4.99% in 2026-09, up from 4.14% in 2025-12, while the renminbi strengthened to 6.71 per dollar from 7.04.

Fact Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · US 10-year Treasury yield, monthly average (Sep 2026, Dec 2025) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) · CNY per USD, monthly average (Sep 2026, Dec 2025) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H3-03 · FACT · H3
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:gl_ust10y@2026-09 = 4.99 · source code GS10 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_ust10y@2025-12 = 4.14 · source code GS10 · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_usdcny@2026-09 = 6.7084 · source code EXCHUS · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC
obs:gl_usdcny@2025-12 = 7.0432 · source code EXCHUS · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 04:49 UTC

The PMI new export orders index was 50.0 in 2026-09, at the expansion line, so the export strength is not yet showing up as broad new orders.

Fact National Bureau of Statistics · September 2026 Manufacturing PMI, new export orders · released 30 Sep 2026
Technical lineage
Claim
C-H4-02 · FACT · H4
As of
4 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC
References
obs:cn_pmi_new_export_orders@2026-09 = 50.0 · source code https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202609/t20260930_1965449.html · released 30 Sep 2026 (source_field) · retrieved 4 Oct 2026, 05:32 UTC